This article examines the role of business, through the World Gold Council, in the evolution of the Conflict‐free Gold Standard (CFGS). Using document analysis of meeting minutes, augmented by interviews with key participants, it is demonstrated that through the use of structural and discursive power, mining firms were able to socialise other actors (governments and NGOs) into accepting a business‐friendly standard. During the consultation process, the standard was weakened sufficiently as to allow business to continue to pursue opportunities in conflict zones. It is argued that the CFGS does little to address the issue of mine site conflict, but instead serves as a mechanism to reassure gold investors and consumers. The paper concludes that the Conflict‐free Gold Standard, like many private governance initiatives, is unlikely to address the issue it purports to. And, that, firms’ contribution to global governance should be cautiously viewed in this light.

Policy Implications

• It should not be assumed that the presence of voluntary governance initiatives and firm codes of conduct equate to improved governance of industries. The private governance initiative explored in this paper, the Conflict‐free Gold Standard certifies very little and instead serves as a mechanism to reassure gold investors and consumers. The claims of firm‐led governance and the robustness of private governance initiatives should be critically examined by policy makers, and firms’ contribution to global governance should be cautiously viewed in this light.
• The inability to address local level issues remains a challenge to private governance initiatives developed at the global or regional level. Firm‐led governance, developed by large MNCs at the global level is unlikely to meet the needs of local communities and should be supported by strong local or national regulation. Policy makers’ approach to global, firm‐led governance should be to ask whether this addresses local issues, and how it might be amended to better do so.
• The introduction of legislation in larger jurisdictions (such as the EU and US) can encourage firms to replicate their approach globally. Done well, this may lead to a race to the top, or the spread of higher standards in jurisdictions where there is non‐existent national regulation.
• The development of the Conflict‐free Gold Standard and the decision by the industry body to place conflict gold on the political agenda may in fact invite the kind of response the industry is seemingly trying to avoid. That is, by stating their product is conflict‐free, the gold industry may have provided a discursive opening for governments, consumers and NGOs to hold the industry to account by demanding a more rigorous standard. This is one way in which policy makers can improve voluntary standards and hold firms to account.

The recent pace of international agreement aimed to reduce tax evasion and avoidance was completely unpredicted prior to the financial crisis. The two targets are often considered to be merely different dimensions of the same problem. This paper argues that the two problems actually involve very different logics, and this holds the key to the prospects for success. The assault on tax evasion confronts a problem that is commonly recognized and admits to amelioration through the increased information sharing that is rapidly, although unevenly, advancing. Attempts to reduce corporate tax avoidance, however, confront ambiguity at every turn. National corporate tax systems differ markedly from each other in rules as well as rates, and agreement necessarily takes place in an ever more competitive international business environment in which national rate and rule setting will remain largely independent. Moreover, increased attention to the international taxation of business seems to have increased rather than dampened unilateral initiatives to advance national gain.

Policy Recommendations 

• The US should require the collection of information on beneficial ownership of companies.
• The US should move swiftly to reduce the corporate income rate substantially while reexamining practices that others states deem abusive.
• Unilateral international business tax reforms by all states should weigh the impacts on others and involve consultation with them.
• The OECD should continue to dampen tax conflicts by applying its expertise on compromise and peer review beyond the G20.